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Abstract. Since the ￿closure debate￿of the 1980s it is well known that com-
parative static derivatives in analytical macro models are highly sensitive to
the closure rule selected. This led Keynesians to conclude that Keynesian
closures were superior to those favored by the orthodoxy and vice-versa. It
is argued that with the advent of agent-based or multi-agent systems, the clo-
sure debate is superseded. While elements of both Keynesian and neoclassical
models survive the transition to the more synthetic environment, an agent-
based approach eliminates the need for drastic simpli￿cation that was at the
root of the debate from the beginning.
1. Introduction
The notion of closure, ￿rst framed by Sen in 1960, was widely discussed in the
literature on applied general equilibrium modeling in the 1980s
1. A central issue was
the comparative statics of aggregate macroeconomic models, which reversed when
the closure was changed. A Keynesian model, with an independent investment
function, usually calibrated to depend on capacity utilization, the rate of pro￿t or
both, responded di⁄erently to, say, a change in the wage rate than did a neoclassical
model in which savings determined the level of investment. This paper argues that
the debate between Keynesians and neoclassicals is e⁄ectively over and attempts
to revive ￿old style￿Keynesian analysis are fruitless
2. This is not to announce a
victory on the part of the Walrasian system, but rather to argue that the debate
has been superseded by the rise of agent-based models, computerized simulations
that do not require the simplifying assumptions of the past
3. The approach has
its roots in the late nineteenth century statistical mechanics of Gibbs, Boltzmann
and Maxwell (Durlauf, 1999). When coded using widely available software by
nonprofessional programers, these models capture fairly complex dynamic social
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situations without regard to representative agents or rules of thumb (Railsback
et al., 2007). Agent-based models are characterized by emergent properties that
are not generally possible to anticipate using strictly analytical tools
4. Thus the
new generation of models represent not only a break with earlier theories, but a
break in how we learn about economies and economics generally.
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 discusses the background to the
debate between Keynesians and the proponents of neoclassical models. Section 3
introduces the multi-agent system framework in the context of complexity models.
Section 4 addresses the question of closure in simpli￿ed Keynesian and neoclassical
models. A concluding section argues that while agent-based models incorporate im-
portant elements from both theoretical frameworks, the divisions are substantially
blurred.
2. Keynes and the Neoclassical Critique
It is a radical thesis to say we should retire Keynes. But it may well be time.
The old debates over the nature of macroeconomic aggregates, whether they were
savings driven or investment driven, have been made largely irrelevant by multi-
agent, dynamical systems that incorporate learning and expectations in a natural
and realistic way. What is sacri￿ced in these models is the idea that representative
agents can compute solutions to long-horizon combinatoric optimization models
that supposedly guide their actions over the course of their lives. Many problems,
much simpler than those we commonly assume that our economic agents can solve,
have been shown by research in theoretical computer science to essentially involve
an in￿nite number of steps, which in the words of one researcher means ￿abandon
all hope of ￿nding an e¢ cient algorithm for the exact solution of this problem￿
(Spiliopoulos, 2007). In agent-based models, agents do indeed optimize but they do
so in computationally constrained ways, involving heuristics, approximate solutions
and the like. They do well when they can determine an upper bound on the
di⁄erence between the approximate and actual solutions.
Agent-based models eliminate the over-simpli￿cation of the Keynesian model
without falling into the ￿representative agent￿trap of the Walrasian system. Nei-
ther do they necessarily assume price-taking atomistic agents. Nor do these models
serve any particular political ideology, since the objective is to model the econ-
omy realistically, as it actually performs, rather than produce welfare theorems
applicable only to perfectly competitive systems.
In the 1970s, the profession began to abandon the Keynesian system as essen-
tially anecdotal in its view of agency (Lucas and Sargent, 1978, p 277), (Plosser,
1989). Although dynamic versions of the Keynesian model certainly exist, the fun-
damental framework was seen as static. But above all, the Keynesian model was
considered unrealistic in response to a change in policy. Keynesian agents were
regarded as reactive only, failing to learn about the economic landscape as it un-
derwent change in response to economic policy. Lucas objected early on, noting
that only self-interest would be invariant to policy change; everything else would
adjust (Lucas, 1976).
By anecdotal, the critics meant that the underlying agents in the Keynesian sys-
tem did not conform to the principles of intertemporal rationality. Since then, of
4 For a general introduction, see Holland (1998) or Waldrop (1994) or for a more technical
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course, experimental economics has provided substantial evidence that the ratio-
nal model is an imperfect foundation on which to build coherent theory (Henrich
et al., 2004), (Basu, 1994). This criticism does not, however, eliminate the need to
measure social welfare in terms of the well-being of the individual agents.
Ex-ante aggregation is at the core of the problem with the Keynesian system.
Since homogeneous agents do not require aggregation, the representative agent ap-
proach solves the problem by assuming it away. An economy in which many people
are better o⁄by some small measure, yet a few are much worse o⁄, could be judged
superior unambiguously. This kind of reasoning could justify very progressive social
policy or its opposite and with equal ease. Without speci￿cs as to who precisely is
better o⁄ and who is not, analysts are left in the dark.
The Walrasian system does not require ex-ante aggregation, but is nonetheless
unrealistic in its reliance on a perfectly competitive economy as well as unrealistic
assumptions about the computational capacities of its agents. If the physical anal-
ogy of the Keynesian system is the perfect gas law, the Walrasian system is closer to
the approach of statistical mechanics, but with perfectly elastic collisions (Durlauf,
1999), that is, with no strategic interactions. Its policy implications all derive from
a generalized libertarian philosophical outlook that denies the existence of ￿soci-
ety￿as separate from its constitutive components. Apparent inconsistencies with
Keynesian macroeconomic theories of e⁄ective demand were resolved at a very high
level, by Sonnenshein, Mantel and Debreu (SMD)
5. The resolution of the con￿ ict
over the shape of the aggregate excess demand curve was simply to abandon the
macro in favor of the more trustworthy microeconomic alternative.
The Walrasian system produced welfare theorems of stunning e⁄ect, if of limited
generality, but it lacked the clarity of the Keynesian policy prescriptions. Just as
the perfect gas law is more useful in solving practical engineering problems than is
the more sophisticated statistical thermodynamic model, the Keynesian system is
still broadly embraced by policymakers worldwide who refer to aggregate demand
and job creation.
When the Keynesian model was dominant, the neoclassical closure was consid-
ered unrealistic because it follows Say￿ s law, that supply creates its own demand.
Too much emphasis is placed on the labor market to determine the magnitude of
the main macroeconomic variables. E⁄ective demand only served to change the
composition of output between savings and consumption. Output was determined
by factors of production on the supply side.
For both camps, the critique of the opposition was essentially that the other
model was ￿too simple.￿Each had elevated one feature to prominence while down-
playing the importance of the factor the other held dear. The closure debate was
about which was the most essential feature, e⁄ective demand or rational choice,
that is structure versus agency.
Now with the aid of computers, the economy can be re-conceived as an evolv-
ing complex adaptive system without the attendant oversimpli￿cations of either
the Keynesian or Walrasian systems. These models include the heterogeneity of
agents and multi-dimensionality of the Walrasian system while at the same time
incorporating social and economic structures present, but largely unexplained, in
Keynesian models. Seventy years after the General Theory, it may well be time
5See Debreu (1974). For an interpretation of SMD theory, see Rizvi (1994).4 BILL GIBSON
for Keynes to retire, but it will be seen that his in￿ uence is still felt in the more
realistic models of the agent-based framework.
3. Multi-Agent Systems
What is a multi-agent system and how does it resolve the closure debate? Formally,
the goal of a multi-agent system is to characterize the joint probability distribution
for the entire stochastic path that is compatible with the conditional probability
distributions for each agent. This entails a number of attractive features that are
not entirely obvious from the abstract de￿nition. Agent-based models involve the
interaction of a relatively large number of data structures (agents). These data
structures interact iteratively with an environment in which they are located. Over
time the result can be chaos or order depending upon how the agents adapt to
their environment. The resulting models are complex adaptive systems and are now
applied in a range of diverse ￿elds, from physics, molecular biology and aerospace
to linguistics, sociology, political science, and of course, economics.
Complexity itself may seem to be a vague notion but in fact can be de￿ned fairly
precisely, at least computationally (Machta and Machta, 2005). Basic computa-
tional theory holds that some problems can be solved in polynomial time, that is
in a number of steps that can be represented by a polynomial in some metric of
the data
6. Many interesting and common problems, the classical example is the
traveling salesman problem, are known as NP ￿ complete; that is, essentially that
have been proven to have no polynomial that describes the number of steps in their
solution. One could search forever.
Complex models are simulation models with the added feature that the laws
that describe the behavior of a complex system are qualitatively di⁄erent from
those that govern its units. In Gell-Mann￿ s phrase, ￿surface complexity arising out
of deep simplicity￿is what typically characterizes the macro behavior.
Emergence is de￿ned as an unexpected drop in complexity where complexity
has to do with the length of the algorithm required to represent the problem, often
described in terms of a stylized computing device known as a Turing machine.
Relative algorithmic complexity (RAC) is de￿ned as
the shortest description that a given observer can give of the sys-
tem, relative to the description tools available to that observer.
Emergence occurs when RAC abruptly drops down by a signi￿-
cant amount.(Dessalles et al., 2007)
Phase transition is a well know example of an emergent property. All such tran-
sitions have an order parameter, which is zero on one side of the transition and
non-zero on the other. There are few restrictions on how the order parameter is
de￿ned, but it must ￿￿ ip￿in some observable way. Some examples include when
liquid water changes to ice at a constant temperature or in percolation when the
fractional size of a spanning cluster reaches a critical value. Transitions may involve
continuous change of the order parameter, or not when some amount of energy is
required for the transition to occur (such as a latent heat)7.
6For example, a sorting problem of n numbers can be preformed according to the (￿rst order)
polynomial n: More compuationally complex problems correspond to higher order polynomials.
7Phase transitions occur in materials as their internal energy progresses through the ￿ve states
of nature, solid, liquid, gas, plasma and the Bose-Einstein condensate. Crystallization of liquids
at their freezing point generates an unexpected drop in complexity inasmuch as the algorithmCLOSURE IN MULTI-AGENT SYSTEMS 5
One way to characterize a transition is by way of the distribution of the order
parameter. Transitional clusters form and the system￿ s properties begin to change
according to a power-law distribution. Most of clusters are small, but it is not
unusual to encounter an enormous cluster interspersed among the far more numer-
ous tiny agglomerations. BarabÆsi and Albert note that power-law distributions
come about when the underlying process, in their case networks, shows preferential
attachment, and produce a ￿rich get richer,￿e⁄ect8
Similar mechanisms could explain the origin of the social and eco-
nomic disparities governing competitive systems, because the scale-
free inhomogeneities are the inevitable consequence of self-organization
due to the local decisions made by the individual vertices, based on
information that is biased toward the more visible (richer) vertices,
irrespective of the nature and origin of this visibility.(BarabÆsi and
Albert, 1999, p 512)
Whether speci￿c agent-based models have power-law distributions of any order
parameter is an open question. Many models show income or wealth distributions
that follow a power-law (Durlauf, 1996), (Gibson, 2007).
Thus, agent-based models are most suited to address how order emerges from
disorder rather than simply characterizing the equilibrium. BarabÆsi also gives the
example of the image of a Ferrari that could be rendered as the result of some
mathematical simulation. A deeper question is what processes were required to
build the Ferrari from the beginning? If these activities can be represented in a
computation framework that converges to the image, then much more has been
learned (BarabÆsi, 2003).
The agent-based framework confers a number of theoretical advantages. The
interaction of heterogeneous agents with respect to a wide range of personality
parameters is central. Some agents learn quickly, others not; some have high con-
sumption goals, others more modest. Attitudes toward risk, education and repro-
duction can all vary as well. Inter-agent communication can be error-free or noisy.
Rationality is inherently bounded by computational complexity and agents may
di⁄er with respect to how long they are willing to search for solutions to combi-
natorial optimization problems. Some agents are more myopic than others, but all
operate with imperfect and limited information. The approach does not bracket
externalities, but integrates them in a fundamental way.
Naturally, the arti￿cial intelligence literature o⁄ers the most extensive and so-
phisticated analysis of learning available. Sutton and Barto, for example, provide
an analysis of reinforcement learning (RL) made up of four component parts. Poli-
cies are actions that agents implement, roughly equivalent to methods in object
oriented programming languages. A policy is a ￿mapping from perceived states of
the environment to actions to be taken when in those states￿and is typically sto-
chastic. In game theory, policies are essentially strategies. The reward function is a
map of the environment and its associated bene￿ts or costs that may be conferred
that describes the lattice structure is more compact than that which is required to describe the
￿uid motion of asymmetric liquid molecules or the random orientation of electron spin as a ferro-
magnetic materials cool. The same emergence of order and symmetry applies to superconducting
ceramics as they reach a thermally induced state of near zero resistance to electron ￿ow. At a
temperature near the critical point of phase change, systems vacillate between the states of matter
with greater frequency as the critical point is approached.
8The result is also known as a Pareto distribution or, more colloquially the 80/20 rule.6 BILL GIBSON
upon local agents. The reward function roughly corresponds to the pay-o⁄ matrix
in game theory and cannot be altered by agents directly. The value function is
an aggregator of the reward function as rewards accrue to speci￿c agents9. Model
equations describe the dynamic environment and are used by the agents to enhance
their learning. It is necessary to specify which model is used by which agents. These
range from simple trial-and-error models to sophisticated state-space dynamic pro-
gramming, Markov decision processes (MDPs) or optimal control models (Sutton
and Barto, 1998).
RL is distinguished from more common supervised learning in that agents are
not told how to behave but must ￿gure it out on their own. Agents can be either
￿greedy￿or experimental. Agents who adopt experimental strategies are more likely
to reach global optima that those who remain in a statis￿cing, locally optimal state.
Models with RL can have rich and realistic trajectories.
4. Closure
Sen describes a particularly simple accounting framework in which the number of
equations is one short of the number of unknowns. Formally speaking the model
cannot be solved, or ￿closed￿ , until an additional equation is found and justi￿ed as
part of the macroeconomic system (Sen, 1963) 10. Closure then refers to selection
of parameters and variables, speci￿cally around the relationship between savings
and investment. In a Keynesian closure, an independent investment function is
present and savings adjusts to it through changes in output. Consider a system
with two accounting equations for income and savings, a consumption function and
a production function
Y = C + I (4.1)
S = Y ￿ C
C = ￿ C + cY
L = lY
with the Keynesian variable list v(Y;S;C;L) or income, savings, consumption and
employment. The parameter list p(I; ￿ C;c;l) includes investment, autonomous con-
sumption, the marginal propensity to consume and the labor coe¢ cient from the
production function. With four variables and four parameters, there are sixteen
comparative static derivatives that characterize the behavior of the system.
To convert the model into a neoclassical closure, parameters and variables in
equations 4.1 simply change places. The variable list for the neoclassical closure is
v(Y;S;C;I) while the parameter list is now p(L; ￿ C;c;l). The only change is that
I has been upgraded to variable status while L is taken as a parameter represent-
ing the constraint on production imposed by the supply of labor. This is most
9Evolutionary models and genetic algorithms strictly speaking do not have value functions. If
the reward function causes the obliteration of the agent operating a particular policy, then the
population learns, even though the individual does not. Agents need not even be able to sense
the environment in evolutionary learning.
10Closure is related to but not the same thing as a ￿gap￿ model, in which there are speci￿c
targets for output and employment and either a savings, foreign or ￿scal constraint binds (Bacha,
1990), (Taylor, 1994). The gap is determined by the amount by which the constraint would have
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the simpli￿ed version of the notion of closure. In the Keynesian model, invest-
ment is the binding constraint; in the neoclassical model it is the supply of labor.
This is a fundamental di⁄erence that has served to historically distinguish the two
approaches.
In multi-agent systems or agent-based models it is ultimately agents and their
decisions that are responsible for all structure. Much rides, of course, on what is
meant by ￿ultimately￿but here is where the approach makes its most important
contribution. It is not necessary to assume a structure in which agents make choices.
The structure embodies previous choices, that is accumulated decisions of the past.
All four components of human activity classically identi￿ed by Aristotle, form,
substance, intention and accomplishment are present, but the last distinction is key.
Agents may have speci￿c intentions, but whether they are able to accomplish their
goals in the context in which they are undertaken is altogether another matter. The
substance given to previous forms through accomplishment changes the underlying
process and the cycle begins anew. The model is inherently dynamic.
Is the multi-agent system framework then just an uber-choice theoretic model?
The principal reason it is not is that agents make decisions in a social context as
just noted. It might be argued that this is true in the Walrasian model as well,
but here there is an important distinction. Walrasian agents are ￿atomistic,￿and
make optimal decisions, taking their environment as given. The issue of whether
agents are able to solve their optimization problem is never posed. In contrast,
in agent-based models, agents are best thought of as computational entities, who
make decisions based in an informationally constrained environment and with lim-
ited computational means in real time. So structure is present, but it is located
within the limitations of the human thought process. Thus, agent-based modelers
take as a central problem the question of how precisely to describe ￿approximately
rational behaviors in operational, computational terms￿(Boutilier et al., 1997, p 2).
Since computation itself requires real time, agents must cease their computational
e⁄ort within an action frame of the model. Frequently, sub-game perfect strategies,
common in analytical models, are beyond the reach of agents (Basu, 1994). This
amounts to a theoretical break with the hard optimization approach of many formal
economic models.
The most stripped down example of an agent-based model that produces emer-
gent properties is the original Schelling neighborhood model (Schelling, 1971).
There white liberals decide if they are going to either stay in the current neighbor-
hood or move. A fully rational decision tree would take into account both the state
of the current neighborhood as well as the expected characteristics of the destina-
tion. In a computationally constrained world, however, one might not be able to
determine the latter as easily as the former. Agents are rational, but boundedly so,
although in more complex models, their computational abilities can evolve within
the model.
The decision rule in the Schelling model is deceptively simple: move if a threshold
of racial homogeneity of the neighborhood is reached. That is, white liberals may
prefer a mixed neighborhood, but if it becomes too black, then the whites decamp
for another. This is the only decision agents make in the model: stay or move.
At the end of some 40-50 iterations, the model converges to strictly segregated
neighborhoods: this simple agent-based model has generated an emergent property,8 BILL GIBSON
segregation, that is not possible to deduce from the characteristics of the agents of
the model.
Gibson describes simple model, based on Schelling, in which agents decide whether
to take a job or not (Gibson, 2007). ￿Stay￿is to accept a given wage o⁄er and
￿move￿ is to reject it. The wage o⁄er might vary from low, say at Starbucks
or Wal-Mart, to high, say an assistant to the chief operations o¢ cer in a multi-
national corporation. Agent job-satisfaction is the key decision variable. Either
the job ￿works￿for the agent, in that it covers expenses and adds to accumulated
wealth, or it does not.
A job can be thought of as a bundle of production processes involving capital,
intermediate goods and one unit of labor, the agent (Axtell, 1999). Hence, the
decision the agent must make is whether to operate the production process in front
of her. In the Gibson model, both a unit of labor (an agent) and an amount of
￿nance are required in order to activate the technology of a given cell. Finance is
available from wealth accumulated by agents in the past and is distributed back to
cells according to pro￿tability with a random error term. Pro￿t is the di⁄erence
between wages and output and is returned to agents in proportion to their wealth.
The wealth-capital constraint does not imply that the system is constrained ￿from
above￿since the wealth is product of the decisions made by individual agents, now
and in the past.
The dynamics of the model depend on the wage bargain between agents and the
cells on which the agents reside. Cells can compute the marginal product of labor,
but agents lack su¢ cient information. Agents can compute their own reservation
wage, based on life-cycle variables, as they age, reproduce and die.
As noted, the decision variable is whether the agent is satis￿ed with her current
job. Job satisfaction depends mostly upon whether wealth is increasing or decreas-
ing, but there are also variables that derive from the RL framework11. Agents must
learn what the grid as a whole has to o⁄er in terms of consumption possibilities.
Unsuccessful agents become ￿stuck￿in relatively low wage jobs either because they
do not have the accumulated wealth to ￿nance a move or they lack the education
and skills required to take advantage of nearby opportunities.
If agents move, they must then Nash bargain over the wage payment with the
new cell. In the Nash bargain, the surplus is de￿ned as the di⁄erence between the
marginal product of labor and the agent￿ s reservation wage. The outcome of the
bargaining process depends on the relative impatience of the agent to the cell. Cells
know that unless they are pro￿table, they will be unable to attract capital and will
fall into disuse. Agents realize that if they reject the o⁄ered wage they must move
again, with all the associated costs and uncertainty. If the agent￿ s reservation wage
exceeds the marginal product, cells raise their prices to compensate, provoking
in￿ ation. As a result, they are less able to compete for ￿nance for their operations
and may experience cell death.
In this simple model the economy grows with less than full employment on a
track that underutilizes the available technology. There is very little that is optimal
about the model in the traditional sense, but neither is it excessively prone to mass
unemployment nor spiraling in￿ ation. As noted, a skewed distribution of income is
an emergent property of this simple system. Even if the economy begins with an
egalitarian wealth distribution, it will deteriorate over time and eventually follow a
11A full description is beyond the scope of this paper. See Gibson (2007).CLOSURE IN MULTI-AGENT SYSTEMS 9
power-law distribution. Educated agents who secure good jobs early and keep them
for a long time end up wealthy. Those who move tend to run down their wealth
but they may also succeed in ￿nding a better opportunity.
Is this model Keynesian, neoclassical? At ￿rst blush, it seems that the model
is more Keynesian in that at any given moment there would be unemployment as
the job search proceeds. Markets are certainly not the central feature, as in the
neoclassical scheme, in that markets in a formal institutional sense do not even
exist. There is no Walrasian auctioneer to announce prices to which the market as
a whole can respond. Unemployment in the agent-based view is not di⁄erent from
underemployment in that agents are modeled as always doing something, operating
some process whether part-time, casual, informal, illegal or what have you.
The model shares a basic Keynesian feature that demand matters. There are
many processes that populate the economic space that could be operated, but
if there is no demand for them, they are not viable. Production processes for
horseshoes are not viable, for example, but for Ipods, they certainly are. It follows
that a demand expansion reduces un(der)employment and causes GDP to rise12.
The problem is that there is no lever to pull to make demand expand exogenously,
no parameter in the model that controls aggregate demand. Government would
have to be built in, as perhaps a coalition of agents as in Abdulla and Lesser,
who show how agents can learn through run-time communication to form e⁄ective
dynamic coalitions by self-organization (Abdallah and Lesser, 2007). Clusters of
demand could then result from the formation of the coalition, but this is not present
in the reference agent-based model of this paper.
Since the important decisions here are made in what would appear to the neoclas-
sical mind as a labor market, does this mean that agent-based models are essentially
neoclassical? To begin to answer that question, consider the comparative statics
of the Keynesian and neoclassical systems. In order to compare the two along a
common metric, we can only consider a change in the parameters that are shared
by both. The comparative statics of any one of v(Y;S;C) can be evaluated with
respect to a change in any one of p( ￿ C;c;l): That is, we may examine the change in
output and its components, consumption and savings, with respect to a change in
the demand parameters for either the goods or labor market.
Notice that a rise in ￿ C; the level of autonomous consumption, or c; will increase
all variables in the Keynesian view, but will only increase consumption and decrease
savings in the neoclassical. As has been seen, this is a direct result of the fact that
output is determined in the labor market in the neoclassical model. The models
are therefore predicting di⁄erent reactions to changes in preferences. Also a rise
in the labor demand, l; will not a⁄ect output in the Keynesian closure but cause
output to fall in the neoclassical.
In the simple agent-based model, an increase in consumption demand will reduce
total savings in the system. It should be clear that there will be no impact in the
current period if some agents decide to raise their consumption levels and decrease
their savings. But iterative agent-based models are intrinsically dynamic and thus
savings in this period must have some impact on the ability to ￿nance production
12Underemployment is the relevant concept here since agents can operate processes with very
little capital and that o⁄er a wage that is below the agent￿ s reservation wage.10 BILL GIBSON
in the next period13. Job dissatisfaction is likely to rise in the next period. Similarly
a rise in labor productivity, (a decrease in l) in a simple agent-based system would
have no impact on current output, as in the Keynesian closure, but would certain
have an impact on the following period. In neoclassical models, all this savings
is invested and there is an increase in the capital stock. If investment exceeds
depreciation, output rises. Keynesian model dynamics are less straight forward
since if investment does not adjust to match the rise in savings, output can fall.
The subsequent unemployment will deplete aggregate savings, restoring the savings-
investment balance. Whether investment increases usually depends on pro￿tability,
expectations and the rate of capacity utilization.
How do the dynamics of the agent-based formulation stack up against these two
canonical models? This is a bit more complicated to visualize. In every period most
agents operate processes and receive a wage. The pro￿t earned in the process is
then pooled and used to ￿nance the capital stock for the next round of production.
Is it possible to have an excess of the supply of ￿nance over demand? It could
come about if the sum of agent wealth is greater than the sum of the demand for
￿nancial capital by each of its cells. In a purely Walrasian model, this would not
happen since the interest rate would fall and the capital intensity of all processes
would instantaneously rise. In the agent-based system, an excess supply is also a
disequilibrium, but agents cannot instantaneously react. In the next period, pro-
ducing cells compete for a higher level of available ￿nance. Following the Keynesian
framework, they compete on the basis of pro￿tability.
Agents can refuse new ￿nance, but they would do so only when they have some-
thing better to do, such as retire or return to school, both of which happen en-
dogenously in the model. When all agents are operating processes and there is
still a surplus of savings, some savings may go underutilized. The system runs at
suboptimal level, but the inability of agents to move instantaneously to more cap-
ital intensive processes is what is responsible, not some given level of investment
demand that the analyst regards as too low 14.
On the other hand, a shortage of wealth relative to the capital requirements of the
processes in operation can certainly throw some agents out of work. This is similar
to the traditional ￿insu¢ cient aggregate demand￿of the Keynesian system. Agents
can decide whether to return to school or search for work in the next period. While
looking for a better job, they may run down their wealth, reducing the number of
processes that can be ￿nanced in the next period; again this looks very much like
a traditional Keynesian model.
How about a shortage of e⁄ective demand? Can agents always sell everything
they produce operating the production processes? In the Walrasian model, they
can; sellers simply lower their prices until all markets clear simultaneously. Here,
again, there is no market per se; agents bargain with each other on the basis of
what they have individually produced. Trading out of equilibrium is inevitable
13If in the Schelling model white liberals were asked to buy a car at the same time they are
considering a move to a new neighborhood, this would certainly reduce the probability of moving.
14Here the e⁄ort to approximate ￿rational behaviors in operational, computational terms￿
comes directly into play. If agents are endowed with higher levels of computational capacity, then
they can learn more quickly and the system as a whole can perform more rationally. It is not the
institutional context, market failure or what have you, but rather the characteristics of the agents
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since there is no ex-ante price provided by an auctioneer. The trades are zero-sum,
however, since any net bene￿t that accrues to one agent is immediately o⁄set by a
loss to the other.
Can there be a general shortage of aggregate demand? Yes, but it shows up
as a shortage of ￿nance to activate production processes that would satisfy the
individual agents, or a shortage of viable technologies. To see this, imagine that
an injection of ￿exogenous expenditure￿takes the form of a new weapons system
for ￿government.￿In that case, a new blueprint would enter the system and the
number of potentially producing cells would increase. Let the blueprint reside in
cell i and consider the jth agent. If prior to the appearance of the government
contract, agent j was satis￿ed with her job, the process might not be activated
because of local labor shortage. But it could also easily be that agent j can now see
the new process and will move to cell i in order to operate the process. To insure
that the process can be ￿nanced, government expenditure might have to ￿jump the
queue￿ , thereby crowding out more pro￿table private processes. This possibility
would have to be built into the coding of a more complete model. Demand would
then matter, but there would be no independent aggregate demand function as in
the Keynesian model.
Multipliers can also be built into agent-based systems, but again this might
be complicated to achieve. The standard explanation of the multiplier process is
through inventory adjustment. As inventories are depleted, ￿rms increase their
demand for goods to restore the desired inventory-sales ratio. The very process by
which inventories recover gives rise to an increase in income, which in turn, causes
inventories to fall back by some fractional amount. For every step forward, there is
a half-step backward as aggregate demand rises. Eventually the process converges
to the new equilibrium.
In an agent-based model, the process would unfold somewhat di⁄erently and lead
to a variable multiplier. As inventories fall, agents might well operate processes
to replace them as opposed to some other process that paid a lower wage. The
inventory replacement process may, however, block the operation of even more
remunerative processes, which agents may subsequently discover. Since agents are
always in the process of learning about their economic environment, producing more
inventories may mean the agents ￿nd the work satisfactory and then break o⁄ the
search for other activities that may indeed be more productive.
It becomes evident that agent-based frameworks build in technological change
in every step of the process. Learning is central. Experimentation is required for
agents to discover optimal properties of the economic landscape and the Keynesian
adjustment process does not allow for that to occur in each action frame of model.
The result in the multi-agent system is a variable multiplier based on technological
interactions built into the grid.
Evidently motifs from both closures, Keynesian and neoclassical, easily ￿nd their
way into agent multi-agent systems. On one hand, savings and wealth drives invest-
ment with a lag, as in the neoclassical model, and Say￿ s law holds in approximate
form. On the other hand, demand matters and drives technological change through
the process of learning. More is to be done, of course, in building realistic macroeco-
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The traditional Keynesian and neoclassical models suppress complexity through
aggregation and the use of representative agents. This does not mean that com-
plexity is absent; it is simply repressed. Agent-based models focus on heterogeneity
and interaction in complex environments. The neoclassical system models savings
and lets investment follow in its path without much comment while the Keynesian
system does the reverse. In the agent-based system, both aspects of the problem
are incorporated.
5. Conclusion
Multi-agents systems provide an interdisciplinary approach that can integrate re-
sults from other disciplines such as sociology, anthropology and political science, as
well as the natural sciences. These models can be made consistent with experimen-
tal and game theoretic results. Since they do not rely on analytical results for their
main ￿ndings, there is no need to invoke arbitrary assumptions to obtain existence
or stability of equilibria. Running the model reveals whether interesting properties
emerge and what happens out of ￿equilibrium￿cannot be safely ignored. Indeed,
agent histories cumulate in a path dependent way to give rise to a statistical distri-
bution of outcomes. How that distribution is characterized becomes a fundamental
property of the system.
￿Closure￿ is not something that any agent can perceive. It makes no sense
to model the decision of heterogeneous agents as responding to whether it is the
supply of labor or the level of investment that is given to the system as a whole. In
old-school macromodels, closure determined the basic character of the model, its
comparative statics and associated dynamics. In the agent-based framework, the
character of the model is not imposed from outside, but rather arises from within
the equations of motion of the individual agents (Gatti et al., 2008).
Is it time to retire Keynes? In some fundamental sense the answer is yes. A new
generation of models represents not only a break with earlier theories but a break
in how we learn about economies and economics generally. Old-style Keynesian or
neoclassical economics that ignore advances in computational theory and practice
is astronomy without telescopes. The closure debate drew its energy from the fact
that both models were fundamentally inadequate. Agent-based models represent a
step forward, and at a minimum, allow us to close the debate on closure.
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